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EXTENSION OF REMARKS 

OF 

HON. AUGUSTUS P^^^ARDNER 

OF JVL^SSA-CHTJSETTS 



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 



JANUAKY 15, 1915 



78166—14434 



WASHINGTON 
1915 



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Safety First. 
EXTENSION OF REMAKKS 

OF 

HON. AUGUSTUS P. GARDNER, 

of massachusetts. 
In the House of Representatives, 

Friday, January 15, 1915. 
Mr GARDNER. Mr. Speaker, in accordance with the permis- 
sion granted me by the House on January 15. I print the fol- 
lowing two articles which I have recently published in the 
newspa])ers : 

Chapter I. What is the matter with the ^avy? 
Chapter II. What ails the Army? 

I. What is the Matter With the Navy? 

ALWAYS SOME OTHEK DAY. 

"The rule is jam to-morrow and jam yesterday, but never 
jam to-day," said the white queen in "Through the Looking 

Gl'T^S " 

The white queen did not happen to be talking of the American 
Navy, but she might just as well have been doing so. 

Listen to thfe debates in Congress and you will be convinced 
that the pages of history furnish an impregnable defense for 
this country. If John Paul Jones could change a peaceful mer- 
chantman into the Bonhomme Richard and defeat the British 
man-of-war Serapis, why can not the like be done again? What 
man has done, man can do— such is the burden of the song ot 
the gentlemen who believe that American genius and American 
freemen need no preparation for war. Is anyone such a dastard 
as to deny that our gallant Naval Militia admirals can on any 
pleasant afternoon forsake their counting houses for the quar- 
terdeck and smash the British superdreadnaughts to smither- 
eens with a fleet of converted Long Island Sound steamers? 

Perish tlie thought. .,^i,^^i 

But if you are so skeptical as to be dubious lest the school 
historv book and the Chautauqua lecture may not be adequate 
to rer^el the attacks of the effete monarchies of Europe and 
Asia, then peruse the hearings for the last 10 years before the 
congressional Committee on Naval Affairs and you may be com- 
forted A more complete docket of experiments about to be 
made and contracts shortly to be entered into and reports to 
be orderetl in the near future and boards soon to be appoiiited 
can not be found outside the records of the circumlocution office 
about which Dickens wrote. ^ ^ *. ^^ -^^ 

The American air man. Wright, was the first in the wide 
world to build an aeroplane which would actually fly. and ever 
since that time we have been experimenting and inspecting and 
reporting and contracting and considering— in fact, we have 
78166 — 14434 3 



been doing everything except building aeroplanes. On July 1, 
1914. France owned 1,400 aeroplanes, while Uncle Sam owned 
23, most of them out of date. However, we recently ordered 
from abroad an up-to-date French aeroplane with two Sahuson 
motors and an up-to-date German aeroplane with two Mercedes 
motors. We were' in hopes that at last we were in a fair way 
to establish a little brood of air craft; but just then the 
European war broke out. Wicked foreigners commandeered 
our purchases; so here we are again just where we started. 

We have as many as 12 submarines on the whole Atlantic 
coast, not counting those at Colon in the Canal Zone. To be 
sure, no one has accused the outfit of being any too new tangled ; 
but, then, pray remember that we are still arguing about the 
best type with which to experiment. Meanwhile the modest 
proportion of 11 out of those aforementioned 12 divers were 
not in diving trim when Commander Stirling reported his 
fleet last November in obedience to the mobilization order. 

Instead of the fleet of fast scout cruisers which the General 
Board of the Navy has told us that we need for our safety we 
have built just three, and they never were of much account, 
even when they were new. For about 10 years we have been 
considering and contemplating types for scouts; but before 
long it is confidently expected that a satisfactory conclusion will 
be reached. 

Admiral Strauss in his annual report tells us that evei'y 
American battleship in connnission to-day is equipped with 
obsolete toipedoes, but that orders have been given and plants 
are being enlai'ged, and that in two years relief will be in sight. 

DAWDLE, DAWDLEj DAWDLE. 

So it goes dawdle, dawdle, dawdle all along the line from 
voter to President. The fact is that the whole ♦Navy has got 
into a rut. It needs a good hard jolt to get it out of the rut, 
and then it needs to be trimmed up and enlarged until it is a 
strong weapon fit for the defense of a strong nation. 

Now, do not blame it all on poor old Secretary Daniels. It is 
only partly his fault, even if he did deprive the seadogs of their 
grog and enter the sailormen in the lowest grade of the kinder- 
garten. 

Of course, Daniels with his super-peace ideas ought not to be 
Secretary of the Navy any more than a liquor dealer ought to be 
chairman of a temperance rally, but that is a small matter. 

Neither is the blame to be imputed to the Navy bureau chiefs. 
There has not been one of them for years who at heart would 
not have been glad to speak right out in meeting and tell the 
country the whole truth as to our needs. But the country has 
hitherto been in no listening mood, and it would have been a 
bold bureau chief, indeed, who cared to face the molten lava 
from the tongues of the " little Navy " men. Let an officer speak 
up and he was damned up and down as a seeker for increased 
rank and power. Let a civilian speak up and he was muckraked 
from stem to stern as a minion of some armor-plate concern. Let 
an association or a league speak up and its membership was 
grilled to find out whether any one of them had a share of steel 
stock or copper stock or any other kind of stock in the family 
unto the third or fourth generation. Neither is the blame to be 
visited on Congi-ess. If any one of us talked about national 
78166—14434 



defencelessuess, some one else talked about jackasses in solon's 
garbs. 

There is just one party who ought to bear the blame, and 
that is the great American Republic, whose exact mirror we 
Congressmen are. Six months ago, if I cared to empty a room, 
nil I need do was to discuss our national defenselessness. To- 
day, if I am anxious to fill a hall, I have but to say. that our 
Army and Navy will be my topic. Six months ago I should Iiave 
lieen a mighty poor politician if I had preached about our lack 
of national defense. To-day I should be a mighty poor politician 
if I were to drop the subject. 

If I were a real hero, I should promise to keep up this crusade 
as long as the Lord might grant me grace. Not being a real 
hero. I content myself with a promise to keep on shouting so 
long as the press will grant me space. 

A COMMISSION TO INQUIRE AND RECOMMEND. 

One disease from which both our Army and Navy are suffer- 
ing is mortmain, especially mortmain of ideas. Mortmain is 
an old English law term, which signifled the " rule of a dead and 
gone hand." We ought to have this case of mortmain treated 
by an impartial commission of inquiry with some new blood and 
no arteriosclerosis of the intellect among the commissioners. 
What we need is a definite plan for the future. What sort of a 
plan for the national defense can we get out of four different 
full committees and four different subcommittees of the House 
and Senate? Yet it was those committees to which we were 
referred when a commission of inquiry into our defenselessness 
was refused us by the administration. Moreover, it does not 
do to forget that those committees, so far as the experienced 
mem'jers are concerned, are' practically invited to inspect the 
results of their own handiwork. 

Let us see how the inspection is faring. Just how far have 
they gone with this investigation? Both the House Committee 
on Military Affairs and the House Committee on Naval Affairs 
have now closed their hearings. Both committees confined them- 
selves almost entirely to the examination of the graybeards of 
the service and to the particular graybeards wh^i the com- 
mittees selected, at that. My requests for the summons of 
Admiral Wainwright, Admiral Winslow, Admiral Brownson, 
Gen. Wood, and Gen. Wotherspoon were absolutely and pre- 
emptorily refused. 

A commission of inquiry, such as I advocated, would summon 
not only bureau chiefs in all their panoply but the hard-worked 
juniors and the experienced enlisted men as well. A commission 
of inquiry would allow the complainant to produce witnesses, 
a privilege which has been denied me by the committees to 
which I have referred. 

SHORTAGE OF MEN PUT SHIPS OUT OF COMMISSION. 

Assistant Secretary Roosevelt and Admiral Badger have testi- 
fied that we are now 18,000 men short of the number required to 
man the serviceable part of our present fleet. This estimate 
takes no account of the crews requisite for vessels now building. 
The General Board of the Navy maintains that in case of war 
we should need from 30,000 to 50,000 additional trained men-of- 
warsmen, and there is no source of supply except about 8,000 
naval militiamen. 
78166—14434 



Ou the other hand. Admiral Blue has testified that we are only 
4.565 men short in case of war and that there is little doubt 
that this demand would be met by ex-service men now in civil 
life. 

To this Admiral Fiske replies that it would take five years to 
get our Navy up to a state of efficiency necessary to fight a 
first-class enemy. 

Let us see what all this juggling and counterjuggling of fig- 
ures means. Does it mean that these admirals differ as to the 
number of men needed to man any particular vessel? Not a 
bit of it. It means that they differ as to how many vessels we 
need and how many vessels we have which are worth manning. 
The next time, gentle reader, that you hear about our fleet of 
33 battleships ask how many of those battleships are in " cold 
storage" to-day with fragmentary crews or no crews at all. 
You will find that no less than 32 of them are launched on their 
way to that bourne whence no traveler returns. Naval authori- 
ties euphoniously term the three stages of a warship's road to 
oblivion as " in reserve," " in ordinary." and " out of commis- 
sion." To be sure, those same naval authorities gravely inform 
us that our " cold-storage " fleet can be got ready for "battle in 
from 3 to 12 months, but they are put to it to explain exactly 
what the resuscitated veterans would be good for when ready 
for battle. By the way, for fear that these 12 battleships should 
feel lonely, there are nearly 80 more of our flghting craft " out 
of commission " or " in ordinary " or " in reserve " to keep 
them company. 

ONLY EIGHT FIGHTING FIRST-CLASS BATTLESHII'S COME NEXT MARCH. 

Perhaps you are saying to yourselves. " Even if 12 battleships 
out of 33 are out of the game, that still leaves a mighty tidy 
fleet." But how about the other 21 battleships, which consti- 
tute our fighting force? Are they 100 pei'centers? Not by a 
long shot. Ten of them belong to the so-called first line and 
11 of them belong to the so-called second line. Of the first 
liners, 2 ships, to wit, the Michigan and the South Carolina, 
are to be relegated to the second line on March 3, 1915. The 
honest factjas that on March 4, 1915, we shall have just S first- 
class battleships in full commission. Now, where is the com- 
mon sense in prating about our 33 battleships? 

If anyone tells you that our .second line of battleships is a 
formidable part of our defense, just pin him down and find out 
how he makes that fact out. I have heard a Navy official 
testify that the second line would be of service if our first line 
was destroyed and the other fellow's first line was destroyed 
as well. So would a police force of octogenarians be of sei'vice 
if policemen were not called upon to handle any criminais under 
80 years old. In private most naval officers regard our second 
liners as an admirable force wherewith to soothe the nerves of 
the timid in case of war. Perchance for that purpose they might 
be as useful as the venerable culverins ha.stily installed at sun- 
dry places on the Atlantic Coast at the outbreak, of the Spanish 
War. It would be cheaper, however, for Uncle Sam, when he 
puts his war paint ou, to conduct a daily clinic for the free 
administration of anesthetics. 

Yet the General Board of the Navy says that we need 48 
battleships under 20 years old for our defense. For our de- 
fense against what nation? For our defense against any na- 
tion except England, so we are told. 
78166—14434 



Ask any member of that General Board which he would 
rather have : 

1. A fleet of 48 battleships ranging in age uniformly from 20 
years old down to brand new ; or 

2. A fleet of 24 battleships, all of them less than 6 years old. 
What the American people want, in my opinion, is a Navy 

up to date, even if it is necessary to enlarge the scrap heap to 
an extent which would make the bureau chiefs' hair curl if 
you could find any bureau chiefs with the requisite quantity of 
thatch for curling purposes. 

THE CRUX OF THE PROBLEM. 

Permit this ignoramus to make a suggestion : 

First. Appoint an independent commission of level-headed 
men. and see to it that not too many of them are imbued with 
the idea that they know it all about the national defense. 

Next, require that commission to summon the best naval ex- 
perts we have and find out — 

First. What war vessels do we need to make us safe against 
any nation on earth? 

Second. How many of those vessels is it safe to put in 
"reserve"; that is to say,'with skeleton crews? 

Now, if it is decided that we are aiming too high in taking 
leave to ask for a Navy capable of swapping shots with John 
Bull, why then we can cut down the estimates accordingly ; but, 
for heaven's sake, let us know the truth. 

The problem as to the number of ships which we can safely 
keep in " reserve " depends very largely on two factors, as 
follows : 

First. How long does it take to make a landlubber into a 
man-of-war's man? 

Second. How many former men-of-war's men, adequately 
trained, can be depended on to return to the Navy in time of 
war? 

On those two questions I should as lief have the opinion of 
a few intelligent junior oflicers and enlisted men as the opinion 
of all the naval experts who ever poured over an encyclopedia. 

On the answers to the question as to the number and types 
of war vessels needed and on the answer to the question as to 
the proportion which can safely be kept in " reserve " with 
fragmentary crews, depends the preparation of any intelligent 
plan for the future. On the answers to those questions depends 
the number of officers and enlisted men which we ought to 
authorize. Do not forget that our Naval Academy can not be 
enlarged in a day without serious deterioration, and that the 
standard of the American man-of-war's man ought not to be 
lowered by the incorporation in our Naval Establishment of 
vast drafts of hastily trained recruits. On the answers to those 
questions depends our building program, and I hope that no one 
is so ignorant as to fail to realize that a very long time is 
required for warship construction. So the inquiry can not 
begin too soon. 

MINOR DEFICIENCIES. 

The shortage of ammunition to which Secretary Daniels testi- 
fied before the Committee on Naval Affairs, the shortage of 
mines which was admitted by Admiral Fiske, the antiquity of 
the battleship torpedoes which Admiral Strauss pointed out, 
even the pitiable air-craft situation which Capt. Bristol re- 
78166—14434 



vealed ; all these facts are startling enough, but a determined 
General Staff of the Navy with plenty of funds could remedy 
them in a year or two. Not so the deficiencies in the ranks of 
our fighting vessels nor the deficiencies in the personnel which 
is to man them. 

Dreadnaughts and crews can not be improvised when the 
war cloud appears above the horizon. Admiral Fiske states 
that it would take five years to get our Navy in a condition to 
fight an eflicient foreign enemy. This opinion is not indorsed, 
perhaps, by the Secretary of the Navy, but it is most distinctly 
in line with what Navy men say when they express their private 
opinions of the privatest kind. 

II. What Ails the Army? 

There is still truth in the old, old story that it is the man be- 
hind the gun who counts. But for heaven's sake, how far be- 
hind the gun do you want the man to be? Must he be so far 
behind the gun that he has not even a bowing acquaintance with 
it until war breaks out? Yet that is where we stand to-day. 
Our Regular Army is an admirable handful. Our reserve army 
is a farce. A good deal over one-third of our militia absolutely 
struck their guns off their visiting lists during the whole of last 
year. 

THE MEN. 

We have only 30,000 Regulars available for a field army and 
120,000 militiamen besides, so says the report of the Secretaiy 
of War. In other words, if every mother's son of them answers 
the call, we shall have 150,000 men to defend us while a new 
army is being made. That means that we could cover a battle 
front of 30 miles on the old Civil War reckoning of 5,000 men 
to a mile. Thirty miles is a long, long way from the distances 
which modern battle fronts cover. 

How about it? Will all our militiamen turn up if they are 
summoned, and what will they do when the howitzer begins to 
howl? It is the correct thing for really patriotic orators to say 
that by nightfall every militiaman will be on hand, bubbling with 
heroism. 

The fact is that this fiction of a trained citizenry rushing head 
over heels to arms in time of war is purely the creature of a 
deft imagination adroitly interpreted by a clever tongue. The 
streugtli of the trained-citizenry argument does not lie in its 
own soundness, but in the fact that most of us are politically 
estopped from saying what we really think about the militia, 
or National Guard, as it is called. Owing to the blessed cir- 
cumstance that my congressional district is amazingly one- 
sided, I shall make bold to say what I really think. I believe 
that most men are actuated by the very best and most unselfish 
motives when they undertake the thankless duties of militia 
service. I believe that militiamen are keenly conscious of the 
fact that many persons scoff at them as " tin soldiers." At all 
events, I know that when I was a militiaman I was sensitively 
alive to the good-natured superciliousness with which my friends 
regarded what to them appeared to be my harmless vanity. I 
believe, moreover, that as the duties are made more arduous 
and more serious the militia steadily improves, although it be- 
comes harder and harder to fill its ranks. On the other hand, I 
do not believe that over tvi'o-thirds of our militia would mate- 
rialize in war time, and I do not think that dependence could 
78166—14434 



9 

be placed upon them until months of severe training and a 
weeding-out process had hardened them into military shape. 

I can not forget that no less than 16 States of the Union fell 
short by greater or less amounts of furnishing their quotas of 
troops during the Spanish War. I can not forget that after 
the first burst of enthusiasm was over cities and towns offered 
bounties in order to fill their quotas of troops in the Ci^al War. 
I can not forget that the National Government later on gave a 
large sum of money to each veteran who would reenlist. nor 
that both the North and the South were eventually obliged to 
resort to the hateful necessity of compelling men to join the 
army against their wills. All those things are none the less 
facts because they are unpopular facts and because it is the 
fashion to blink at them. 

Neither can I shut my eyes to the report of the Chief of Staff 
on the record of the militia for the year ending June 30, 1914. 
Out of 120.000 militiamen, all tolrt, 23.000 failed to present 
themselves for the annual inspection, 31,000 absented themselves 
from the annual encampment, and 44,000 never appeared on the 
rifle range from one year's end to the other. 

WHEN THE CAPITOL WAS BURNED. 

The President says that we have always found means to de- 
fend ourselves against attack, but the President is quite mis- 
taken. " We shall take leave to be strong upon the seas in 
the future as in the past," says he in his annual message to 
Congress. That was the very same position which President 
Madison took at the time of the War of 1812. " We shall take 
leave," quoth Madison, and take leave he certainly did. bag and 
baggage, militia, statesmen, clerks, lobbyists, julep mixers, and 
all. Down into Virginia he went, leaving the Capitol and 
the White House to be burned by the victorious British. 

Poor Dolly Madison ! She saw it all, and she wrote her sister 
Anna these bitter lines : 

Alas, I can descry only groups of military wandering in all direc- 
tions, as if there was a lack of arms or of spirit to fight for their own 
firesides. 

But there was no lack of spirit in those militiamen from 
Maryland and Pennsylvania and Virginia. Far from it. They 
had spirit enough and arms enough to defend their own fire- 
sides, but they did not know how to do it, because they had not 
been molded into an army. They were but a mob of citizenry 
under arms. The sad part of it all was that they had had two 
years in which to prepare, for these events did not occur until 
the summer of 1814. But the administration of that day had 
fostered the belief that the country had been misinformed and 
that the Government had not been negligent of the national de- 
fense. Hence it was that these poor militiamen were not ready 
when the day or trial came. A maddened Nation roared for a 
sacrifice and a sacrifice was vouchsafed unto them. Armstrong, 
the Secretary of War, was made the scapegoat, just as Alger 
was made the scapegoat for our unreadiness to fight Spain, and 
just as Garrison would be made the scapegoat to-morrow if we 
were to attempt unsuccessfully to put a large force of men into 
the field. 

But the removal of Armstrong did not erase an exceedingly 
distressing passage from this Nation's histoiy. That disastrous 
story harasses us to-day as it harassed our fathers before us. 
It will fulfill a useful purpose, perhaps, if it serves us as a 

78166—14434 



10 



bittei.' warning against being unprepared. On the coast of 
beautiful County Down, in Ireland, stands the picturesque 
town of Rosstrevor. For all its picturesqueness, I shall never 
visit that town and I shall never see the granite shaft which 
dominates its market place. That graceful monument was 
ei-ected to the memory of Gen. Robert Ross, who burnt the 
Capitol at Washington, and its cost was defrayed by the officers 
of the Chesapeake force. I do not care to see it. 

So much for our Regulars and our militia. There remains 
to be considered our reserve army of former enlisted men. We 
can dismiss it with a word, for President Wilson says that we 
are not to depend on a large reserve army. Perhaps it is just 
as well not to depend on it entirely, for at present it consists 
of but 16 men. 

THE GUNS. 

Come to think of it. I have got quite a distance away from 
the gun in following the man who ought to be behind it. If 
by the word " gun " a ritle is meant, then we have plenty to 
give to all comers; that is, at the rfutset of any war. If, how- 
ever, when we say " gun " we mean cannon, then the first 
difficulty facing tlie man would be to find the gun to get 
behind. 

Nine weeks ago, Maj. Gen. W. W. Wotherspoon, Chief of 
Staff and virtually head of the United States Army, made his 
annual report to the Secretary of War. If Gen. Wotherspoon 
had never done anything in life except write page 12 of his 
report, he would deserve the thanks of the Nation for that 
superb act of courage alone. I know of nothing of the sort 
which approaches it except the courage of Admiral Fiske when 
last month he testified to the condition of our Navy. Perhaps 
I ought to include in the same category the fearlessness of Capt. 
HoBsoN, who for years has stood the gibes of his colleagues and 
faced the ridicule of the press while he thundered in the ears 
of an unattentive public the sad story of the dwarfing of our 
Navy's normal growth. 

But to return to page 12 of Gen. Wotherspoon's report. He 
tells us that before a war breaks out we must accumulate rifles, 
cartridges, field artillery, and field-artillery ammunition. He 
tells us how much we ought to have and how much is actually 
on hand or in sight. Here is the table : 

Chief of Staff's report, Nov. 15, 19U (p. 12). 



Munitions 
required as a 

reserve in 

anticipation 

of war. 



Munitions 
on hand or 
in process of 
manufacture. 



Rifles 

Rifle cartridges 

Field guns (exclusive of giant guns,) 
Field gun ammunition, rounds 



642,541 

646,000,000 

2,834 

11,790,850 



698,374 

241,000,000 

852 

580,098 



So you see that we are short 400.ri00,000 rifle cartridges. 
11.000,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, and 2,000 fleld guns, 
if Gen. Wotherspoon's judgment is sound. 

Of course, I am not an expert in these matters, but 580,000 
rounds of fleld artillery ammunition seems rather inadequate 
78166—14434 



11 

as a reserve in the light of Gen. Wood's testimony that Russia 
shot away 250,000 rounds against the Japanese in the Battle of 
Mukden alone; yet 580,098 rounds is all we have on hand. I 
am told that Lieut. Hunsaker's report, lately sent over from 
France to the War Department, tells of a French cannon firing 
500 shots in a day. Of course, that must be an extreme case. 
But cut the figure in half and you will find that 1,000 such guns 
would shoot away in two days all the artillery ammunition 
which we have now plus all which we shall manufacture up to 
July 1. By the way, Russia had 1,204 guns engaged at Mukden 
and Japan had 922 guns extending over the same front, so 1,000 
guns is not an imaginative figure. I do not know whether Gen. 
Wotherspoon's estimate of 2,834 field guns is excessive or not. 
The testimony before the fortifications committee in 1913 showed 
that Russia at that time had 6,000 field guns, while Germany 
had 5.000 field guns. 

The horrid significance of the whole business lies in the fact 
that it takes so long to make these munitions of war, even with 
unlimited appropriations. The good Lord knows that we never 
shall have unlimited appropriations for public undertakings In 
defense of our Nation so long as we need unlimited appropria- 
tions for public buildings in defense of our seats in Congress. 

SLOW WORK MAKING GUNS AND AMMUNITION. 

Last year and this year the Committee on Military Affairs 
took up the question of the length of time required to make 
munitions of war. The following facts stand out impressively : 
Working three shifts night and day, all the factories in this 
country. Government and private as well, can turn out in the 
first six months after war is declared but 400,000 rounds of 
artillery ammunition, or only 150,000 more rounds than Russia 
shot away in a single battle. They can make about 1,600 rounds 
per day, or enough to keep 8 guns going under an ordinary 
battle condition of 200 shots per day. In one year all Govern- 
ment and private factories put together can turn out 500 field 
guns, or one-quarter of our shortage, as (Jen. Wotherspoon 
estimates it. 

FRIEND hay's TABLES. 

My friend Hay, chairman of the Committee on Military 
Affairs, publishes a table of our requirements in the way of 
munitions of war which differs vastly from Gen. Wotherspoon's 
table. Three times I have publicly asked Chairman Hay to 
summon Gen. Wotherspoon and put him through his paces for 
his temerity in ignorantly setting up his opinions against a 
Congressman's. The first time, the good chairman pointed out 
that the general had gone on the retired list a few days ago; the 
second time, he invited my attention to the fact that the hear- 
ings before his committee were closed ; and the third time, he 
told me that it was no use summoning Gen. Wotherspoon, 
because he knew all about his ideas ali'eady. 

Incidentally my efforts to secure the summons of Maj. Gen. 
Leonard Wood have been equally unsuccessful. Yet, Gen. 
Wood is not on the retired list. He preceded Gen. Wotherspoon 
as Chief of Staff, and he now commands the Department of the 
East. 

As to Chairman Hay's tables. I note, for instance, that he 
estimates 200,000,000 cartridges as a sufficient equipment for a 
field army of 460,000 men. That estimate is ju.st one-third of 
78166—14434 



12 

the estimate made by the General Staff of the Army for that 
identical number of men. It is true that 200,000,000 cartridges 
will equip the machine guns and will fill the men's belts and will 
suffice for the combat train and the first ammunition train, but 
400,000,000 additional cartridges are needed for the advance 
basis and the general bases. At least, the General Staff says 
so. However, Gen. Crozier, the star witness for the defense, 
coincides with Chairman Hay on this point. It is fair to admit 
that the general was frank enough to admit that Army men 
do not agree with him. 

WHY NOT A FEW TITANIC GUNS FOK US? 

But where are all the giant guns which we progressive Amer- 
icans ought to have? How are we off for these wonderful 
implements of warfare with which other nations have been 
arming themselves? We still are shaking hands with ourselves 
over our biggest gun, the 6-inch howitzer, and doubting those 
newspaper stories about the big field guns in Europe. 

Tradition hath it that after the Battle of Crecy a board of 
French generals was called together to report on the new- 
fangled weapons called cannon which England had used in the 
fight. After profound cogitation, the generals decided that no de- 
pendence whatever could be placed in gunpowder and that cannon 
could be useful only under exceptional circumstances never likely 
to occur again. By a unanimous vote, so the story runs, they re- 
ported to their ruler that the trusty manganel and the stout cata- 
pult would triumph in the future as in the past. If anyone wishes 
to know the moral of this tale, let him inquire of our ordnance 
experts. It may be that we have no need of guns with greater 
diameters than 6 inches. Still Germany's 16J-inch howitzers 
and Austria's 12-J-inch guns seem' to be fairly serviceable in 
battering to bits anything from an impregnable fortress or a 
venerable cathedral down to a covered trench. Sir John 
French — foolishly, perhaps — seems to place some reliance in 
his 9i-inch thunderers. We smile at their puerile performances 
and continue to estimate and plan and report and consider and 
congratulate ourselves that we have the tidiest little 3-inch field 
guns which can be made, even if we are a little bit slow in rush- 
ing into the making of big ordnance. Let those foreigners waste 
their money on perfecting submarines and aeroplanes, Zeppe- 
lins and howitzers. We propose to keep our money in our 
pockets. That is the way to talk if you want to catch the 
votes. Let us waitfnlly watch and then proceed to reap the 
benefits of the foreigner's experiments without costing us a 
cent. All of which is vastly crafty, no doubt, provided no for- 
eigner starts to experiment on us. 

THE DOWNY DOVE. 

Oh, well, what's the odds, since the apostles of pudginess tell 
us that they are going to put an end to wars by the brotherhood 
of man. In the sweet bye and bye, perhaps, when we have 
abandoned the Monroe doctrine and when the Californian in- 
termarries with the Chinaman and the Mississippian intermar- 
ries with the negro. Until that day is at hand, do not forget 
the parable of the foolish virgins, who had no o.i in their 
lamps when the fateful moment came. 

78166—14434 

o 



